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In an increasingly integrated world where political and economic
issues are deeply intertwined, the regulation of international business
activity raises complex problems in international law. The existence of
the multinational corporation, which is possessed of multiple identities
and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of both "home" nations, where
it is headquartered, and "host" nations, where its subsidiaries are located, makes the potentiality of jurisdictional disputes among nations
particularly acute. While attempts to apply United States law to American foreign subsidiaries virtually ensures conflicts among jurisdictions,
excusing subsidiaries from compliance with domestic law could seri-
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vide a substantial incentive for companies to shift operations abroad so
as to escape U.S. jurisdiction altogether.
The virtual inevitability of jurisdictional conflict among states in
today's world, coupled with the growing necessity of finding ways to
ameliorate such conflict in a world becoming increasingly interdependent, has generated numerous suggestions as to how these conflicts
can be resolved or at least muted. The two remedies most frequently
advanced are (1) adherence to principles of international comity and
(2) what might be described as the "comprehensive international agreement" approach. Though both proposals are based on the same philosophical supposition-the need for cooperation among contending
nations-the two differ in their respective estimations of what kind of
cooperation is both necessary and possible.
Proponents of the comprehensive approach advocate global adherence to an overarching agreement whose terms would not, by their very
nature, permit extraterritorial disputes to arise. Proponents of comity,
while accepting the inevitability of such conflicts, identify certain principles which would form, if applied to discrete jurisdictional disputes, a
framework for their resolution.
After identifying some of the tenets and shortcomings of the international agreement approach, this perspective will discuss several factors which affect the ability of nations to apply the principles of comity.
The main contention of this perspective is that how a particular conflict
arises, that is, whether it arises through conflicts of statute, policy, or
regulation, bears heavily on how and whether the dispute can be resolved.
It is clear, for example, that statutory conflicts are by no means the
only causes of jurisdictional dispute. Conflicts may arise when the extraterritorial application of one nation's law impinges on the domestic
or foreign policies of another nation whose statutes may be silent or
neutral on the subject. Other times, even if the statutes and policies of
two nations are congruent with respect to a particular matter, the way
in which one state implements its laws can bring the two countries into
discord.
The potential circumstances of jurisdictional disputes are myriad:
statutory law of one country versus statutory law of another country;
statutory law versus policy; policy versus policy; statutory law versus
administrative regulation; administrative regulation versus administrative regulation; policy versus administrative regulation; and so forth.
Each type of conflict raises different issues which, in turn, can fundamentally affect the ability of governments to resolve it. This perspec-
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tive will discuss several of these factors within the context of the
principles embodied in the doctrine of comity.
The "international solution" is perhaps best exemplified in a recent article by Professor Raymond Vernon of Harvard University.'
Vernon argues that nations must agree to limit their jurisdictional
reach through a commitment to "radically new principles governing
the status of foreign-owned subsidiaries." 2 Under this plan, governments would agree that foreign-owned affiliates "lie wholly inside the
jurisdiction of the country in which they do business"' 3 and would further agree to deal collectively with common problems through the creation of a new set of international institutions.4 These institutions would
"cover the whole range of major relationships between business and
government, from drug labeling and pollution to taxes and competition." 5
Though proposals of this type could resolve jurisdictional disputes
by eliminating extraterritoriality altogether, it is doubtful that agreements along these lines will be achieved in the foreseeable future. Developed states are likely to show strong resistance to relinquishing
jurisdiction over entities now regarded as nationals or subject to the
control of nationals for fear that policies and activities urged upon
them by host countries might be inimical to the interests of the "home"
governments.
In the United States, for example, there might be great concern
over the inability to control what are regarded as corrupt practices by
American subsidiaries since their bribery of foreign officials might not
be subject to prosecution under United States law.6 There might be
similar concern about permitting American subsidiaries overseas to
participate in boycotts against other American citizens or against
friendly third countries pursuant to foreign policy objectives with
which the United States disagreed.7 For their part, developing host
1 Vernon, Multinationals:No Strings 4ttached,33 FOREIGN POL'Y 121 (1978).
2 Id at 129.

3 Id.
4 Id. at 134.
5 Id. at 133.
6 HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, UNLAWFUL CORPORATE PAYMENTS ACT OF 1977, H.R. REP. No. 95-640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 5 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
H.R. REP. No. 95-640]; SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES AND DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT, IMPROVED DISCLOSURE ACTS
OF 1977, S. REP. No. 95-114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977).
7 SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, EXPORT ADMINISTRATION
ACTS OF 1977, S. REP. No. 95-104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, 22 (1977) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.

No. 95-1041.

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

1:349(1979)

states are also likely to balk, as Vernon himself notes, at the establishment of any international mechanism for dispute settlement which
would deprive them of their zealously guarded right to pronounce their
own judgments and impose their own penalties against malfeasant foreign corporations. 8
Without discounting the possibility that transnational mechanisms
might be created to deal successfully with a number of common economic and social problems--tax and environmental matters may be
promising candidates-it is doubtful that any nation will waive the
right to unilateral and extraterritorial action in matters pertaining to
national security or other interests considered to be of fundamental importance. It is difficult, for example, to imagine the United States subscribing to an agreement which, in principle, would make it possible for
American subsidiaries abroad to transfer critical military technologies
to foreign adversaries. Moreover, national interests considered to be of
fundamental importance vary according to time and circumstance.
Laudable objectives and principles embodied in an international agreement relating to boycotts, for example, might generate considerably less
adherence when applied in highly charged political settings.
However skeptical one may be regarding the realization of a comprehensive international solution, it is difficult to quarrel with the philosophy of cooperation and compromise which it embodies. Indeed, if
such conflicts are to be resolved, contending parties must recognize that
national interests are neither mutually exclusive nor equally important
and that differences in national law and policies must be accommodated.
These are by no means new revelations. In international law, of
course, these considerations form the foundation of the doctrine of
comity. Section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations
Law states:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law
and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the
part of a person, each state is required ...

to consider, in good faith,

moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction in light of such
factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the
territory of the other state,

(d) the nationality of the person, and
8 Vernon, supra note 1, at 131.
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(e) the extent to which enforcement action of either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed
by that state. 9
There are, of course, impelling practical reasons why states often
seek to accommodate conflicts in their laws. Just as they pursue a variety of domestic objectives, not all of which may be in harmony, so too
do they pursue a multiplicity of objectives and interests vis a vis other
nations. It is, therefore, often possible to find common interests coexisting alongside those that conflict. Reciprocal needs and desires
often comprise a transcendent rationale for cooperation which goes far
towards explaining the willingness of states to adjust laws and regulations so that overall relationships are not jeopardized. On this point,
the Arab League boycott of Israel is instructive.
Participating Arab states have determined it in their collective interest to conduct economic warfare against Israel and to enlist the support of third countries and their nationals in this effort. These are goals
which the government of the United States does not share. 10 At the
same time, Arab nations are interested in acquiring American goods
and technology, and the United States recognizes both the importance
of continuing Arab purchases and the significance of Middle East oil to
this nation's overall economic well-being. The United States also fully
appreciates the strategic importance of the Middle East, as well as the
critical role which must be played by moderate Arab countries if a
comprehensive and lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is to be
achieved. Several key Arab states, fearful of radicalism and revolution,
are equally cognizant of the value of a continuing American presence
in the region.
These overlapping interests provided an incentive for American
policy-makers to write and enforce the anti-boycott law in a manner
permitting the United States to realize its basic objectives, while simultaneously respecting the Arab right to conduct a primary boycott."
Though the United States believed it essential to apply the anti-boycott
law to American subsidiaries residing in boycotting countries, it also
recognized the right of the Arab states to establish laws and policies
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

(1965).

§ 40

10 For a concise statement of the U.S. interest in opposing the participation of U.S. firms in the
Arab League Boycott of Israel, see Moore, UnitedStates Policy andthe Arab Boycott, 71 PRoC.
AM. Soc. INT'L L. 174 (1977).
11 Though there is a rich literature on the subject of the Arab League Boycott, a good-if
unsympathetic--examination of the U.S. response is provided in Kestenbaum, TheArab Boycott
in U.S. Law. FawedRemediesfor an InternationalTrade Restraint, 10 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
769 (1978).
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applicable within their own territories. The desire to accommodate this
potential conflict gave rise to one of the exceptions in the anti-boycott
law permitting U.S. nationals residing in boycotting countries, including controlled foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies, to comply with a
host nation's boycott laws with respect to certain importing activities, as
well as activities conducted solely within those nations."2 For their
part, many Arab states have sought to minimize potential conflicts between their boycott laws and U.S. law by such measures as agreeing to
accept "positive" certificates of origin for goods received from U.S. exporters.13 Both sides have shown a willingness to moderate their respective claims of jurisdiction in recognition of the desirability of
minimizing conflicts and so that other vital national interests and
objectives are not imperiled.
The United States has often been drawn into jurisdictional disputes with its allies over the extraterritorial imposition of export controls. Under the amended Export Administration Act of 1969, the
government may restrict exports to the extent necessary to protect the
national security, to further the nation's foreign policy, or to protect the
domestic economy from the drain of scarce resources. 14 These are not
necessarily mutually exclusive objectives. The integration of contemporary politics and economics often leads to an intermingling of goals
and their consequences so that an ostensibly economic objective also
may have important national security and foreign policy dimensions.
Obversely, U.S. export restrictions applied to U.S. subsidiaries abroad
can have momentous implications for the economy, foreign policy, or
national security of nations which serve as hosts to these enterprises.
Though the past several decades have witnessed bitter disputes
over the extraterritorial imposition of U.S. export controls-especially
when such controls have been exercised over non-strategic exports to
Communist nations-in more recent years the United States has exhibited some willingness to moderate the exercise of its jurisdiction in accordance with the principles of comity. In 1974, for example, the
United States was embroiled in two serious controversies relating to its
embargo against Cuba. When a U.S. subsidiary in Argentina attempted to sell Cuba a shipment of automobiles, the Treasury Department responded by blocking the firm's export license. Argentina,
12 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403-1a(a)(2) (Supp. 1 1977). For a discussion of these exceptions, see
Marcuss, The Antiboycott Law.. The Regulation of InternationalBusiness Behavior, 8 GA. J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 559, 566-74 (1978).
13 For an explanation of "positive" and "negative" certificates of origin, see id. at 567-70.
14 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977). This provision has not been altered by the
recently passed Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72 (Sept. 29, 1979).
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which strongly supported the transaction, countered by threatening to
nationalize the company involved. After much diplomatic maneuvering, the sale was finally permitted, via a special license, in the interests
of maintaining harmonious political relations with Argentina.
That same year, after initially attempting to halt the transaction,
the United States bowed to Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau's protests and permitted the sale to Cuba of railroad equipment containing
U.S. components. Following the decision of the Organization of American States to terminate its collective embargo against Cuba, the United
States decided in 1975 to moderate the scope of its own embargo
against that nation.1 5 The export of most non-strategic items by U.S.
foreign subsidiaries now is permitted if the firms operate in countries
where local law or policy favors trade with Cuba and if the proportion
of U.S. components involved in the transaction is twenty per cent or
less.16
These experiences, however, do not suggest that the United States
never ought impose foreign policy related export controls extraterritorially. There may be times, particularly when important national principles are at stake, when there is no morally or politically defensible
alternative. The Cuban experience does suggest, however, that when
the application of U.S. law threatens to impinge upon the sovereignty
and foreign policy prerogatives of third countries, sound policy-making
requires that consideration be given to several issues.
First, the extraterritorial application of trade regulations for foreign policy reasons is a game that more than one can play. As more
countries which are hosts to U.S. subsidiaries come to have their own
multinational firms operating within the United States, the threat of
retaliation becomes more likely. When the governments of the Arab
League sought to force the compliance of American firms with the boycott of Israel, the United States was properly exercised over this infringement of its sovereignty. One also can well imagine the outrage
which would be generated in this country if one or more Arab nations
should direct any of their subsidiaries located in the United States to
terminate exports to Israel.
Second, attempts to enlist the support of American subsidiaries
abroad in the achievement of United States foreign policy objectives
15 For a discussion of these and other selected controversies regarding extraterritorial conflict
of the Export AdministrationAct
over U.S. export controls, see Note, Extraterritorial4pplication
Amendments of 1977, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 741 (1978), and Greene, The Arab Economic
Boycott of Israel The InternationalLaw Perspective, I1 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 82 (1978).
16 15 C.F.R. § 385.1(b) (1979).
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often can serve to buttress the pervasive belief in many less-developed
host countries that American firms are mere appendages of the United
States government. To the extent that this occurs, the United States is
likely to find its political relations with host countries strained. It also
is possible that less-developed host nations will begin to regard and
treat U.S. subsidiaries as aliens and thereby deny them benefits available to domestic corporations. In the long run it is beneficial to the
United States to have its corporations behave and be treated as citizens
of the host nations in which they operate, as long as the firms' activities
do not threaten fundamental interests. It is precisely these kinds of issues and the serious questions which they raise that have caused policymakers and the international legal community to look to cooperation
and compromise as the most promising means of diminishing jurisdictional disputes.
Not all jurisdictional conflicts, however, necessarily require a solution. Some may be moot or merely theoretical, as in cases where the
policies and laws of the United States are in harmony with those of the
host nation with respect to a certain regulatory activity. A U.S. law
prohibiting controlled subsidiaries from complying with secondary or
tertiary boycotts might cause little consternation in a host country with
an identical policy or in a host nation which has no established policy
on the matter. Yet even "theoretical" conflicts can cause great concern
in an era of nationalistic sensitivity. Few nations favor foreign bribery
of their government officials. The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act,17 however, could be resented if it were interpreted as a messianic
or paternalistic attempt by the United States to save other nations from
their own corrupt leaders. Similarly, extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust law, even when done to protect foreign nationals from monopolistic predations, could be objectionable if the foreign state had its
own antitrust laws, or if it were seen as an American attempt to export
the principles of free enterprise and competition to nations not in sympathy with these notions.
As a practical matter, adherence to comity is facilitated when legislation which sets out policy objectives leaves wide latitude for administrative implementation. Stringent laws which leave little to the
administering agency also leave little room for the weighing, balancing,
and compromising that is the very heart of comity itself. Especially in
circumstances where states have politically charged or emotional interests at stake, flexibility in administration, and enforcement can deter
17 Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (Supp. 1 1977)).
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the hardening of positions which often leads to results opposite of those
originally intended.
In formulating the U.S. anti-boycott legislation, for example, congressional intent clearly was to resist foreign encroachments upon
American sovereignty.'" On the other hand, Congress did not intend to
impinge on the sovereignty of the Arab nations or to foreclose the possibility of United States-Arab cooperation in other areas of mutual interest. By carefully defining "United States commerce" for purposes of
extraterritorial application of U.S. law,' 9 and by carefully constructing
the "exceptions" to permit compliance by American subsidiaries with
essentially primary boycott requirements,2 0 the Commerce Department
was able to accomplish congressional purpose and carry out United
States policy without trampling on the legitimate jurisdictional claims
of other nations. Similarly, in administering the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission has sought to follow Congress' directive to prohibit bribery of foreign officials but to
permit certain "business facilitation" payments to lower level functionaries that are frequently a matter of custom, if not law, in many foreign
lands. 2 '
In the antitrust field, the Justice Department has made it clear that
the Sherman Act and other relevant statutes will be interpreted and
enforced in light of new international economic realities and the desire
to accommodate the important interests of other countries: "to apply
the Sherman Act to a combination of United States firms for foreign
activities which have no direct or intended effect on United States consumers . . .could encroach upon the sovereignty of a foreign state
without any overriding justification based on legitimate U.S. interests." 2 2 In short, the greater flexibility and freedom of action inherent
in administrative remedies make them generally preferable to strict legislative solutions with respect to problems that arise in the regulation of
international business activity.
A related factor is the desirability of intergovernmental consultation. Close cooperation and discussion among affected governments
can be especially important when the conduct or activity to be regulated has been mandated or encouraged strongly by one of the govern18 See, e.g., S.REP. No. 95-104, supra note 7, at 21.
19 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d) (1979).
20 15 C.F.R. § 369.3 (1979).
21 For an extensive discussion of Congressional intent regarding so-called "grease" payments,
see H.R. REP. No. 95-640, supra note 6, at 8;S. REP. No. 95-114, supra note 6, at 10.
22.
TIONS

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST Div., ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERA-

7 (rev. ed. Mar. 1, 1977).
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ments involved. Through such discussion with their foreign
counterparts, government officials can learn, before final action is
taken, the nature of the policy differences that separate them. They can
determine whether basic principles or less serious issues are at stake. If
important political forces are at work, each side can learn what steps it
might take to minimize the potential political danger to the other government. The purpose of intergovernmental consultation is not necessarily to eliminate outstanding policy or legal differences among
contending nations. On the contrary, in countries such as the United
States, it is the function of administrative officials to implement, not to
frustrate or alter, existing law and policy. Nevertheless, consultation
can lead to the discovery of ways in which implementation can be effected with the least amount of damage to other vital interests each
country has in common with the other. Moreover, to the extent that
this can be achieved, the formidable obstacles which any nation faces
in enforcing its laws extraterritorially may likewise be reduced.
That consultation can be an effective vehicle for moderating jurisdictional disputes is not a matter of great debate. Though not always
successful in suppressing resentment, the United States for many years
has discussed with affected third countries the extraterritorial scope of
export controls imposed for national security and foreign policy purposes. In the antitrust field, however, it historically has been unclear
how much latitude U.S. officials have had for such discussions with
their foreign counterparts. Some observers, however, believe that recent court decisions indicate that domestic law contains an "element of
discretion" sufficient to provide American officials with a basis for such
discussions.2 3 Indeed, the United States and Canadian governments
agreed, in June 1977, to work out consultative procedures in antitrust
cases affecting U.S. and Canadian national interests.2 4
Yet even when two governments have an interest in conferring
with one another, establishing an acceptable mechanism through which
it will take place often raises troublesome issues. First, governments
generally prefer to deal with administrative agencies rather than with
foreign legislative bodies. For foreign governments to defend their policy choices before the United States Congress, for example, would be
tantamount to denying the very sovereignty they are attempting to preserve.
23 See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). See generally Annot., 40 A.L.R. FED. 314 (1977); Stanford, The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct
Outside the United States. A Viewfrom Abroad, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195, 210 (1978).
24 Id. at 207.
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Second, if foreign governments are willing to work with administrative agencies, they also are likely to insist upon confidentiality as a
precondition for their participation. "Off-the-record" interchanges between foreign and domestic officials are often likely to be controversial
with the public, particularly when such conversations relate to legislatively mandated rules or regulations. Apart from the fact that exparte
contacts tend to create an imbalance in the public record, those whose
comments on proposed regulations are available for public inspection
can be expected to believe it unfair that the views of foreign officials are
not similarly subject to disclosure. Given the renewed American commitment to "government in the sunshine," secretive consultations and
delicate regulatory diplomacy may appear inappropriate and may even
generate suspicion. Yet failure to permit such in camera discussion is
likely to cast a pall over foreign willingness to participate, especially
when highly sensitive issues are concerned.
Third, it is important to recognize that the mutuality of interest
necessary for intergovernmental consultation may not always be present. Indeed, when extraterritorial application of U.S. law works to
their advantage, foreign governments may not be interested in limiting
it at all.
The United States is today faced with formidable economic competition. To the extent that American antitrust, securities, environmental, export control, or other laws place U.S. subsidiaries at a
competitive disadvantage vis a vis their foreign counterparts, other governments are unlikely to feel they have much to gain by a reduction in
the extraterritorial application of these statutes. On the contrary, foreign governments may perceive their best interests as lying in expanded
American restrictions on their business enterprises. Some observers
have charged, for example, that the Europeans and Japanese have profited greatly in the Soviet, Eastern European, and Chinese markets by
the American use of export controls. It is also possible that America's
competitors may derive benefit from U.S. anti-boycott and anti-bribery
laws. In the antitrust area, U.S. law which prohibits American firms
and subsidiaries from combining in foreign markets, or from forming
consortia in order to finance large-scale industrial projects, augers well
for European or Japanese firms whose governments permit or even encourage these practices. For the same reasons, producer cartels such as
OPEC or the fledgling bauxite organization may be expected to oppose
the principle of competition which lies at the heart of U.S. antitrust
law. These nations are certainly unlikely to find much advantage in
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international negotiations aimed at establishing a uniform antitrust
code.
A key factor affecting the application of principles of comity is
how broadly the entities and transactions subject to domestic law are
defined. In the United States, the critical terms are frequently "United
States person" and "United States commerce," since U.S. law is often
applied only to U.S. persons and only with respect to transactions
within U.S. interstate or foreign commerce. Identifying all third country subsidiaries of United States firms as subject, in all circumstances,
to the jurisdiction of this country is generally unsatisfactory since many
nations, including Great Britain, France, and Canada, do not regard
mere ownership or control of such affiliates as a sufficient condition for
asserting jurisdiction. Moreover, attempting to place the entire universe of international transactions involving U.S.-origin goods under
United States law would constitute a gross interference with the legitimate interests of other countries.
Under its export control laws, the United States has attempted to
deal with the problem of possible overbreadth in several ways. The
Treasury Department's Foreign Assets Control Regulations, issued
under the authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act,2 5 extended
domestic trade controls to all foreign subsidiaries owned or controlled
by domestic firms and to all persons who were citizens, residents, or
physically present in the United States, regardless of whether U.S. origin goods or technology were involved.2 6 Though Congress amended
the Trading with the Enemy Act in 1977 to limit its use to wartime,27
the Export Administration Act was simultaneously amended to provide
the Commerce Department with discretionary authority for the nonemergency exercise of extraterritorial trade controls when vital national
security interests are involved. 28 In practice, however, the Commerce
Department generally uses this authority only when U.S.-origin parts,
components, or technology are included in a transaction. A similar approach was taken by the United States in 1978 when it began to embargo U.S. exports to the South African police and military: the
prohibition does not extend to trade conducted by U.S. foreign subsidiaries when that trade involves foreign-origin products and technology.2 9 In the case of Rhodesia, the international character of the
25 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1976).
26 31 C.F.R. § 500.329 (1978).
27 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1) (Supp. 1 1977).

28 Title III, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 95 Stat. 1629 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2402, 2403, 2405
(Supp. 1 1977)).
29 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a) (1979).
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United Nations embargo has permitted the United States to side-step
the controversial issue of third-country affiliates; the Treasury Department's Rhodesian Sanction Regulations do not include American subsidiaries located outside Rhodesia in the definition of "persons subject
to control."3

With respect to what constitutes "United States commerce," an interesting approach to the problem of overbreadth may be found in the
anti-boycott provisions of the Export Administration Amendments of
1977.31 Under the regulations, a U.S.-controlled subsidiary's transaction with a boycotting country generally is regarded as being in United
States commerce when the subsidiary acquires goods or services from
the United States for the purpose of completing the transaction with a
boycotting country. Excluded from U.S. jurisdiction, however, are
transactions by foreign affiliates in goods which they manufacture
themselves and so-called "ancillary services," such as figancial, accounting, and legal services, even if provided to the subsidiary by
United States sources.3 2 One rationale was that such services are typically interchangeable with those available from foreign sources; a rule
which discouraged U.S.-source ancillary services would thus have little
positive anti-boycott effect.
A particularly liberal nexus test appears in the de minimis principle
which was adopted with respect to the continuing U.S. embargo of
Cuba. By 1975, the United States had recognized that the embargo,
imposed twelve years earlier, was no longer required for national security reasons but continued to have utility for foreign policy purposes.
Moreover, many Latin American nations which had previously joined
in the embargo had subsequently reversed their policies and were now
openly promoting trade with the Caribbean island. As a result, U.S.controlled foreign subsidiaries now are granted export licenses for most
non-strategic goods, if the proportion33of U.S. components contained in
the item is less than twenty percent.
In the United States, there is at present no hard and fast rule for
determining how broad the scope of U.S. law will be with respect to
foreign subsidiaries of American firms. The determination seems to be
made within the context of particular regulatory schemes and depends,
in part, upon the nature of the national interests the regulations are
designed to serve. Given the wide variety of purposes-ranging from
30
31
32
33

31
50
15
15

C.F.R.
U.S.C.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.

§ 530.307 (1978).
app. § 2403-1a (Supp. 1 1977).
§ 369.1(d)(4) (1979).
§ 385.1(b) (1979).
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national security to foreign policy and antitrust to antipollution-for
which the United States seeks to regulate the conduct of its business
enterprises, it is perhaps impossible to propound a single uniform standard. Moreover, it probably would be unwise to attempt to do so. Protecting the interests of the United States, while simultaneously
accommodating the legitimate concerns of other sovereign nations,
often requires the drawing of fine and sometimes seemingly arbitrary
distinctions not easily defined in advance or in the abstract.
It is clear that not all extraterritorial conflicts are created equal.
The nature of the conflict, the way in which it arises, and the interests
and issues at stake will determine whether and how it can be resolved.
If trade is to be maximized and other basic national objectives are to be
attained in a diverse and rapidly changing world, policy-makers must
recognize that preserving flexibility is essential to the reconciliation of
competing views and conflicting jurisdictional claims.

